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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY:
A SYNTHESIS
INTRODUCTION
In a world substantially altered in this century as a
result of the products of research and development, and with the
elements of security of most nations directly affected, government
institutions and policy processes in the United States remain
heavily domestic in orientation. Contrary to common assumption,
this is at least as true for the scientific and technological
enterprise as it is for any other.
Some of the most important issues and needs relevant to
science, technology, and international security, are presented
in the following pages and in the accompanying papers. The paro-
chial nature of U.S. national institutions, however, makes it
peculiarly difficult to come to grips with some of these needs,
or to anticipate them in any orderly way. For many years this
problem has plagued U.S. government attempts to deal with the inter-
national implications of research and development (R&D), and inter-
national science and technology. The problems and the dangers
now become more pressing as scientific and technological competence
in other nations becomes more formidable. New measures are
needed, yet the issue of excessive domestic orientation is only
rarely identified or directly confronted. Without some attempt
to understand this issue, actions that focus on the specific needs
discussed below are likely always to remain ad hoc, and seldom
equal to their tasks.
BACKGROUND
The results of science and technology have had dramatic ef-
fects on the restructuring of nations and of international affairs,
particularly in the 35 years since the Second World War. Air-
craft, satellite communications, health and sanitation measures,
missiles, nuclear weapons, automated production, radio and tele-
vision, agricultural mechanization, and new crop strains all
bear witness to the productivity of R&D and, in their effects, to
the profound revolution in human affairs they have brought about
or made possible. The pace of change, furthermore, shows no sign
of slackening.
International affairs have been heavily influenced by the
differential ability of nations to carry out and capitalize on
the results of R&D. Two nations have emerged with military power
and influence far greater than others largely as a result of
natural endowments and resource bases that have allowed massive
exploitation of science and technology. The gradual decay of
that dominance, especially in its economic dimension, is already
a source of new international relationships and problems. The
disparity among nations of the North and South in ability to
acquire and exploit technology is also a major factcr in their
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relative economic status, and in their increasingly acerbic
political relations.
Concurrently, the pace of industrialization of technological
societies has greatly intensified the dependency relations among
states, so that even the most advanced societies find themselves
critically dependent on others for resouces, information, capital,
markets, food, and even technology,
Traditional geopolitical factors have been altered or expanded
by advances in science and technology to include, inter alia,
size and number of long--range nuclear missiles, satellite commu-
nications and surveillance capability, competence of the educational
system, fundamental change in the very significance of major con-
flict, and critically, R&D capacity.
The results of R&D have also given rise to new technologies
of global scale, creating wholly new issues in international
affairs, notably atomic energy and space exploration. Also a.
matter of worldwide concern are the side effects of technological
development. The resultant changes have altered traditional inter-
national issues and created major new ones, such as transborder
environmental concerns, stratospheric modification, and ocean
exploitation.
Not all of these changes in international affairs directly
bear on security, but the web of interactions in a technological
world makes it difficult, even misleading, to exclude, say, economic
concerns of developing countries from the concept of international
security. In fact, the broad issues of food, health, resources,
energy, and population are aspects as legitimately a part of
security as are military issues.
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Given these effects of science and technology on the ihter-
national security of states, it is ironic that the support for
science and technology is primarily a national endeavor, partic-
ularly in the United States. Policies for R&D are seen in a
national perspective, and come primarily from national governments.
This means, however, that international or global needs are not
likely to be adequately taken into consideration in a national
decision process.
A natural result of the nation/state system is that decisions
in all policy areas are usually made unilaterally within one nation.
Moreover, the apparent worldwide intensification of nationalism
in the face of economic difficulty, not least in the United States,
further encourages unilateral decision making. The parochial
nature of decisions concerning R&D, however, goes beyond normal
constraints of nation-based decision making and funding. The
decentralized nature of public funding for research means that
it is predominantly considered within the context of mission
agency budgets. Even for those agencies whose rationale has a
basic foreign policy motivation (DOD, DOE), the actual decisions
and choices are heavily influenced by domestic pressures and
inputs. Some departments or agencies are in fact precluded by
their legislative charter from committing resources for anything
other than domestic problems. All are faced with a budget process,
in both the Executive and Legislative branches, that discouraqes
(or often denies) all departments except foreign policy agencies
the right to allocate their own R&D funds for other than U.S.-
defined problems.
In the private sector as well, research decisions are heavily
-AJ-
conditioned by the U.S. market, with American industry still
primarily concerned with U.S. sales, and only gradually adjusting
to the growing share of exports in the economy.
The implications of this situation are evident throughout
the discussion of specific issues below, and deserve subsequent
elaboration to suggest possible policy or institutional departures
that could be undertaken.
Of course, not all issues are handicapped by this particular
institutional limitation. What follows is a broader discussion
of the issues in the interaction of science, technology, and
international security that are likely to be central questions
over the next five years. Though the focus is on a five-year
period, policies cannot sensibly be seen in that short time frame
without taking into account long- -term objectives. Where relevant,
what are in effect assumptions about desirable futures will be
spelled out. The final section will be concerned with some of
the institutional and policy process questions raised by the
specific issues.
KEY ISSUE AREAS
It is tempting to start with national security issues,
which appear to be most directly related to the subject. But,
economic issues will probably receive policy priority in the
next few years, with important consequences for international
security. In addition, as significant as defense issues are,
they tend to receive more concentrated attention. Hence,
defense issues Will be addressed later in this paper, with-
out in any way denying the fundamental significance of science
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and technology to security issues and, particularly, to
international stability.
Economic Issues
Competition and Cooperation Among Advanced
Industrial Countries
It is not a novel observation that the most serious short-
term problem of the United States and of other Western industrial-
ized nations is and will continue to be coping with inflation
in a largely stagnating economic situation. Unemployment rates
are high in many countries (over 9 percent in the United Kingdom
at the end of 1980), with inflation at the double-digit level
for several. The relatively bleak economic outlook has many
causes; analysis of them within the context of this paper would
be inappropriate. However, not only do economic problems affect
the international role of science and technology, but some
measures individual countries may take for economic purposes
will affect the course of science and technology or limit the
international flow of scientific and technological information.
Industrial Policy. It has become almost a fad to speak
of the need in the United States for an industrial policy'or
for reindustrialization. Several aspects of reindustrialization
are particularly relevant to R&D. One is the ability (legal,
political, and psychological) of the United States government
to work cooperatively with individual companies or a consortium
to support research designed to improve the international com-
petitive position of U.S. industry. Antitrust considerations,
among others, have deterred such joint activity in the past.
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Two initiatives in the Carter adm.inistration have shown
that at least some of the barriers can be overcome. The joint
research programs on automobile engines, with a consortium of
auto companies (Cooperative Automotive Research Program), and
the cooperative program for ocean margin drilling, with a group
of oil companies, have received the advance blessing of the
Department of Justice. These initiatives are now in jeopardy
or cancelled. The international economic payoffs of cooperation
of this kind (and the costs of not easing the way) may justify
reconsideration of this policy in the next several years. Whether
or not the government is involved, the advantage to international
competitiveness of allowing research cooperation among companies
in the same industry may create new support for antitrust policy
legislation. Clearly, such legislation would provoke major
political controversy.
' A related aspect of industrial policy is the tendency of
the United States to apply to U.S. companies operating abroad
the same rules and constraints that apply inside the country.1
The essentially adversarial relation between government and
industry in the United States, whatever its historical justifi-
cation or merits in spurring competition, often serves to-put
American companies abroad at a disadvantage in competing with
companies directly supported and often subsidized by other govern-
ments. This is particularly relevant in high-technology industries,
as companies in other countries are now able to compete as tech-
nological equals for the major new markets that will determine
future economic strength. Obviously many complex and contertious
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factors will arise as this issue is addressed, but they must
be discussed. The economic stakes are high.
The key determinant of America's competitive technological
position is, of course, the strength and innovativeness of its
high technology industries. Domestic science policy, including
support for research, tax incentives, regulations, quality and
adequacy of education, and other elements will crucially affect
the economic scene in years to come. In addition, specific tax
and other policies that bear directly on industry's decisions to
carry out R&D either abroad or in the United States will require
examination, though it should not be an automatic conclusion
that overseas research by American firms is necessarily against
U.S. interest. Overseas research can contribute directly to
American R&D objectives, enhance the possibilities for larce-
scale cooperation (more on this below), and contribute to know-
ledge generally.
One of the greatest dangers of the current economic malaise
in Western countries, coincident with serious competition from
third world countries and from industrialized countries (especially
Japan), is the possibility of a rise in protectionism--to preserve
dying zr inefficient industries. These industries may be failing
for any number of reasons: increased labor costs relative to
other countries; changes in cost of other factors of production,
particularly for energy and resources; lower productivity; lagging
innovation; inadequate industrial organization and others. The
temptation to respond politically to worsening domestic unempi.cy-
ment and its ancillary effects by preserving and p
inefficient industries is very great, especially when a certain
amount of implicit or informal protectionism is practiced by
most countries in one way or another (hidden subsidies and biased
regulations, for example).
The economic costs of a protectionist spiral among indus-
trialized countries, and the consequent loss of incentives for
innovation and support of R&D could be very great. In
effect, protectionist measures are an alternative to R&D invest-
ment, at relatively low short-term cost and very high long-term
cost: a poor bargain, but one likely to be proposed and actively
sought by powerful forces in the near future.
One specific protection issue has emerged in recent years
over the export of new technology which, it is argued, is
tantamount to the export of American jobs as that technology
becomes the basis of new competing industries. The argument is
that technology developed in the United States is sold to others
at a price that does not adequately reflect the true costs, or
the broader effects on the United States of that sale. It is a
disputed issue, not only with regard to the facts, but also
whether this is a case in which the possible cure might be
worse than the disease. For example, is the current government
oressure to exclude foreign students and faculty from advanced
integrated circuit research facilities at universities a wise
policy? This is an issue likely to be more visible in the future.
Finally, under the heading of industrial policy the
relationship between domestic regulatory policy to protect health
and safety, and a nation's international economic position mu1st be
included. Already under intense scrutiny, this subject is certain
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to be the focus of important debate in the next five years. The
basic concern is that unequal regulations from country to country
can result in substantially different costs of production, thereby
changing each nation's comopetitive position. That claim is made
now with regard to American environmental and safety regulations
that are presumed to have important effects on U.S. export poten-
tial. Equalizing regulations worldwide would be one way to manage
the problem when it exists, but that would not always reflect
different conditions in countries, different factors of produc-
tion, or different values. Regulations can sometimes improve
competitive position if the costs of compliance are higher
in other countries competing in the same market. At times,
regulations are simply a disguised trade barrier. Once again,
the complexity of the situation does not allow simple judgments
or generalizations. The positive current account balance of
the United States in the last months of 1980, in the face of
high energy costs and an improving U.S. dollar value would seem
to belie the negative effects argument, but it is not known what
the balance would have been in the absence of regulation.
Moreover, the issue is usually cast not only in specific cost
terms, but also with regard to the delays, uncertainties,, and
bureaucratic constraints imposed on industry by what is seen
as a burgeoning regulatory environment.
The Reagan administration has indicated its intention to
address this issue directly. It is hoped that sound data and
analysis will support any actions taken.
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Cooreration. Scientific and technological cooperation
among Western technologically advanced countries is not rare.
When compared with the scale of investments in R&D and the common
goals of Western countries, however, the number of cooperative
projects, especially in technological development, is rather
small. The explanations are obvious: difficulties encountered
in organizing cooperation; concern over losing a competitive
position; and, most important, the basically domestic orientation
of most governments. Meshing of programs, objectives, budgets,
and people is much more complex than when carried out within
one country.
Current economic needs and constraints may now put co-
operation, especially technological cooperation, much higher
on the agenda. Industrial countries are all in need of
technological progress to meet their social, political, and
economic requirements, at the very time when the economic
situation that created these requirements also serves to
place severe budgetary constraints on national R&D expenditures.
Today's nearly equal competence in science and technology
among countries also means that a given project is likely to
benefit from larger application of resources. In some cases,
participation by more than one country may be necessary to
attain a critical size. The massive investments required in
many fields of central and growing importance, especially
energy, also make the possibilities of cooperation to reduce
the drain on national budgets particularly attractive.
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The difficulties and costs of cooperation cannot be
ignored:
e inherent difficulties of meshing disparate
bureaucracies;
* delays in reaching decisions among differing
political and legal systems;
e complications of varying decision processes,
priorities, and competencies;
* cost of international bureaucracy;
e the danger of political inertia, which makes
projects hard to start, but even harder to
stop;
o the possibility of drains on research budgets
because of international commitments;
a the tendency to undertake internationally only
low priority projects;
a the apparent conflict between cooperation and
improving a nation's competitive position.
Successful cooperation also requires reliable partners. The
record of the United States in modifying or abrogating agreements
makes future agreements harder to reach. Most recently, the
proposal to cancel the coal liquefaction development project with
Japan and Germany, and to withdraw from the International
Institute of Applied Systems Analysis have damaged our repu-
tation as reliable partners.
Difficulties are formidable but the potential benefits
are also formidable. Successful examples of cooperation
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(airbus, International Energy Agency projects, coal lique-
faction until this year) demonstrate it can be done. Greater
willingness of the U.S. bureaucracy to look outside the
United States and recognize the competence and knowledge
available elsewhere, and the greater experience the bureau-
cracy would attain through making the effort, would be substantial
additional benefits of accelerating the pace of international
cooperation. The forms of cooperation (bilateral, trilateral,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--OECD) all
need to be examined for each case, though the OECD is the logical
organization in which to lay the groundwork and establish a
design among Western countries. Increased attention to genuine
international technological cooperation ought to be an important
task of the 1980s.
North/South Science and Technology issues
The differential ability to acquire and exploit tech-
nology is a major determinant of the strikingly different
economic situations and prospects of nations of the North
and South, and one of the prime sources of the political
disputes among them. Differences in technological capability,
however, are potential levers for constructive assistance and
cooperation. Can this nation grasp those opportunities,
which play to its strongest suit--its technological strength?2
The fate of developing countries in economic, political, and
military terms in coming years will have a great deal to do with
international political stability, and with the security of all
nations, not the least the United States. It is reasonable cc
forecast that international turbulence will be centered in the
developing world. That estimate is reflected in U.S. military
and foreign policies. It is much less evident in official eco-
nomic policies--the U.S. commitment to economic assistance is
scandalously low relative to that of other industrialized countries.
The various reasons for U.S. indifference and frequent opposition
to foreign assistance cannot be usefully probed here. However,
the central nature of technology in development does provide a
focus for exploring how to maximize the U.S. role, whatever the
aggregate scale of assistance, and for highlighting some of the
particular issues within specific fields (such as agriculture
and population) which need to be confronted.
Economic growth, political stability, and a working economy
in a developing country (with important effects on agricultural
production, resource availability, reduction in fertility, and
markets for American goods) can all be advanced by external assis-
tance from the United States. It is in our national self-interest
to provide this assistance.. This is not to deny that the more
economically advanced a developing country becomes, the more
competitive it is with the United States; nor is it to deny that
political stability does not automatically follow growth, or that
the political objectives of developing countries may differ from
our own. But U.S. self-interest is better served by the steady
advancement of developing countries than by lack of progress.
Whether or not economic assistance to developing countries is
high on the U.S..agenda at the moment, there is a substantial
probability that it will be forced there through political or
economic crises, or national calamities such as widespread drought.
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Technology Policy to Developing Countries. It is no longer
necessary to justify the importance of technology in development.
Technology is essential to management of the problems of agri-
culture, health, environment, industrialization, population,
energy, and most other aspects of a modernizing society, and is
recognized (sometimes overemphasized) in most developing countries
to be essential. The United States, whatever its relative decline
in technological leadership, is still the world's strongest
technological nation, with a broad and flexible education and
research establishment.
The technological capability of most developing countries
is steadily improving. Nevertheless, most research is carried
out in the developed countries either for military purposes
or for the domestic problems of those countries. Perhaps no
more than 5 percent of global R&D can be said to be devoted
exclusively to problems of development. In a setting in which
industrialized nations have such a stake in economic growth and
elimination of poverty in the developing world, it makes little
sense to devote so little scientific and technological effort
to problems that are peculiarly those of developing countries.
Much of this R&D cannot and should not be done in indus-
trialized countries, for practical as well as philosophical and
political reasons. To be effective, to work on the right problems,
to be sensitive to local needs and preferences, to produce solutions
that fit and are likely to be adopted, to keep up with and adapt
technology--all require R&D defined and carried out locally. In
turn, this implies attention to the building of the scientific
and tCchnoloaical infrastructure in developing countries.
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This does not mean, however, that all research relevant to
developing countries needs must be carried out locally. Many
areas of basic research can more effectively be done in existing
laboratories; many problems are generic and can be more quickly
investigated in experienced laboratories with resources and skills
already deployed; many technological problems require general
solutions before locally adapted applications are possible. Per-
haps most important is finding ways to elicit commitments from
scientists and engineers in industrialized countries to work on
problems of development in a sustained way that allows cumulative
benefits and continuous attention. Long-term availability of
financial resources is essential, not only to make such com-
mitment possible, but also to make it respectable in the eyes
of disciplinary peers.
Transfer of existing technology to developing countries is
no longer seen as an adequate alternative. Experience shows
that such transfer, especially of public technologies of health
and agriculture, is inefficient or inappropriate without adequate
receptors to choose, adapt, finance, and develop knowledge to
fit local environments and needs. Technology requires adaptation
to a unique social, economic, and political as well as technical
environment. Also, it tends to change that environment, often
quite rapidly, so that mutual adaptation of technology and
environment is a continuing and dynamic process.
Relations of developing countries with multinational corpo-
rations also require local capability. The bulk of industrial
technology is transferred to developing countries through private
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investment by international firms. To work effectively with
technologically advanced companies, without losing control of
the resulting development or being exploited economically, pre-
supposes the ability to set realistic objectives, negotiate
contracts, weigh often esoteric choices, and in general be fully
aware of technological and economic options.
Thus, a significant and growing indigenous capability in
developing countries is required. And, it must embrace basic
science as well as technology, for without the insight and self-
confidence created by an indigenous scientific community, a de-
veloping country will lack the ability to control its own develop-
ment. In short, what is required is greater allocation of research
resources to development problems in advanced countries, espe-
cially in the United States, and the building and strengthening
of indigenous capability in developing countries.
To date, the ability of the United States to help in either
of these efforts has been seriously limited, because of the low
level of resources allocated, and because of the institutional
and policy constraints that deter or prevent effective commitment
of scientific and technological resources for other than domestic
purposes. At present, essentially all research devoted to prob-
lems of developing countries must come from the foreign assistance
budget either spent directly by the Agency for International
Development (AID), or through transfer to other U.S. government
departments and agencies. With minor exceptions, departments
and agencies are prohibited by their legislative charters or by
the budget process from spendingC any of their own funds on
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objectives other than domestic ones. Thus in an overall federal
R&D budget well in excess of $35 billion, the total allocated
for objectives directly related to developing countries, is on
the order of $100 million, or one-third of 1 percent. 3
The result is not only very limited in terms of R&D
output; it also means that the competence of the U.S. govern-
ment's technical agencies is barely tapped on issues to which they
could significantly contribute. When all funds come by transfer
from other agencies, there is no incentive to build staff or
agency commitment, to work on these issues with their con-
gressional committees and university or industry constituents,
or even to know through experience how they can contribute.
The rationale for these legislative restrictions and for
budget compartmentalization stems from the early history of the
creation of cabinet departments and agencies, and from natural
management principles of tying program objectives tightly to
appropriate funding sources. The trouble is that as foreign
and domestic issues have become more closely intertwined,
corresponding reflection in the allocation of resources
has not taken place. And the rigid budget compartmentalization
does not take into account the often mixed purposes (combining
technological and development assistance goals) of many possible
programs.
The implications of these institutional restraints go
farther. Astonishingly, the United States has no governmental
instrument for cooperation with other countries, unless that
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cooperation can be defined either as scientifically competitive
with domestic research and development, or as foreign aid for
the poorest of countries. Thus, the United States cannot respond
to those developing countries that have graduated from the poorest
status, the very countries with developing science and technology
capabilities best able to make use of cooperation with the United
States, though not yet able to compete at the scientific
frontiers. These countries have the greatest interest in
substantive cooperation (often without any transfer of dollars),
and are in the best position to begin solving their own problems
as well as assisting in attacking global problems.
In fact, in recent years, the United States has undertaken
rather substantial efforts at developing bilateral science and
technology cooperation with these countries. Those initiatives
have had to be taken primarily at the White House level directly,
with major problems of planning and implementation. And now,
at least some bilateral agreements that already have been
negotiated may be abandoned as a result of large, targeted
budget reductions.
The opportunities to use America's strength in science and
technology in cooperation with other countries to further, U.S.
objectives (political and economic as well as scientific) are
likely to grow in the coming years. The'absence of an adequate
institution and policy process to plan and fund these programs,
and to engage the competence of the American scientific enter-
prise, both governmental and private, will be an important issue
that will have to be confronted. The Institute for Scientific
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and Technological Cooperation (ISTC), which was proposed by
the administration in 1973 and authorized but not funded by
Congress, was designed to correct some of these institutional
and process deficiencies.
Food and Agriculture. Some issues within the context of North/
South relations stand out in their importance and in the likeli-
hood they will or should be the focus of much greater attention
in the next quinquennium in the United States. One of these is
food and agriculture, because of its fundamental nature in the
development process and the great concern that increases in
agricultural productivity will not keep pace with the growth of
population that already includes several hundreds of millions
chronically malnourished.4 It is estimated that food production
must increase at least 3-4 percent per year if significant
imrpovement is to occur by the end of the century.5
The United States has a unique role to play because
of its unparalleled agricultural production, a's well as its
R&D capabilities. For the reasons cited earlier, however,
much of the necessary R&D and experimentation must be carried
out in the countries trying to improve their own agricultural
enterprises. This implies building greater indigenous capa-
bilities than now exist, and also strengthening and expanding
the enormously successful international agriculture research
centers that have been primarily oriented to, and staffed
by, developing countries. The recent move to devote more
of the resources of these centers to the applied problems
of improving agriculture (low-cost technologies, water con-
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servation, etc.) are much to be applauded. The international
centers must not be seen as alternatives to individual country
capacity, but as necessary complements to allow some economies
of scale, to focus resources on generic problems, and to provide
an essential psychological tie to a world community for a some-
times isolated scientist in a poor country.
The U.S. research community could play a substantial role,
larger than is at present likely. One impediment is the budgetary
process, cited earlier, that bars the Department of Agriculture
from effectively committing its own funds for agricultural problems
not seen as domestic.
Another is the organization of agricultural research in
the United States that is essentially a state-based structure
without the extensive tools for central planning or quality con-
trol. That makes it difficult to ensure the essential quality
of the entire aqricultural R&D effort, to build competence in
areas of study not peculiar to the United States, or to enable
effective planned connections to be established between developing
countries and the United States on agricultural R&D on any satis-
factory scale.
It is also important to note that improvement in agricultural
productivity is not dependent solely on advances in traditional
areas of agriculture. Water conservation, climate, energy, pcst
control, and low-cost technology, and the social sciences related
to agricultural economics, innovation, application and distribu-
tion, are, inter alia, of equal importance. The agricultural
research agenda must include those areas as well.
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Population. Although fertility has declined in recent
years, growth projections remain high enough to cause serious
problems of starvation, economic stagnation, and political unrest. 6
The international system has only begun to feel the effects of
forced or voluntary migration across borders, which is likely
to become a major cause of international political instability
in the future; in addition, there is the already evident internal
instability that arises from urban migration, un- or underemploy-
ment, lack of adequate food and sanitation, and serious health
problems.
Science and technology cannot solve the population prob-
lem, but they can provide the necessary tools for public policy.
In particular, more research is needed to provide low-cost
contraceptive technologies (especially including male contra-
ceptives), and to increase our understanding of the social
determinants of effective family planning policy. Fertility
decline is so closely related to other aspects of development,
particularly health, food, sanitation, transportation, and
communications, that in a sense all technological research can
contribute indirectly or directly to the population problem.
In population-related (and health.-related) subjects, We
find a special variant of the domestic orientation of U.S.
institutions. Health and safety regulation of drugs in the
United States is based on risk-benefit criteria keyed to the
United States. Thus, proposed contraceptive drugs are evaluated
for safety based on the risks of health side-effects in the U.S.
environment, when the risks and benefits are likely to be quite
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different in another country. In some cases, American pharma-
ceutical companies are deterred from developing a drug at all,
since the benefits of protecting against some diseases (schisto-
somiasis, for example) are so low in the United States that any
risk of side-effects would overwhelm potential benefits, while
in another country the benefits would greatly outweigh the risks.
The reverse side of the coin is the stringent testing
regulations in the United,'States that have led some companies
to test drugs for safety in other countries, in effect using
their people as guinea pigs for the U.S. market.
Neither situation is tenable. Some means must be found of
internationalizing drug evaluation, as it would not be appropriate
to expect the Food and Drug Administration, for example, to
institute its own criteria for evaluating drugs for foreign appli-
cations that would be different from criteria for U.S. applidation.
The general problem of encouraging greater commitment of U.S.
scientific and technological attention, whether in government,
industry, or university, to population- and health-related
issues should be an important issue in the near future.
Transborder Issues
A series of transborder and global science and technology
issues will be important elements of the international security
picture in the next five years, though the separation of these
from "economic" issues is rather arbitrary. The importance of
environmental, ocean, resource, and energy issues will be
largely in their economic and ultimately political effects, as
is the case for those just discussed.
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Resources and Encrgy
In the short term, the major issues related to security,
resources, and energy have to do with supply interruption
engendered by political action, and secondarily, the economic
terms on which resources are made available to industrialized
.7
societies.
A major political phenomenon of recent years is the assertion
of the right of absolute sovereignty over natural resources. It
is a natural concomitant of a nation state system, but has not
before been sanctified as it is today. The growing dependence
of industrialized societies on resources under the control of
others, particularly developing countries, creates major
dependency relations, many fraught with great uncertainty and
danger for international stability.
The dangers come not only from the threat of supply disruption,
or of sudden dramatic increases in the cost of the resources, but
also from the second-order strains created among industrial coun-
tries whose disparate dependence on resources from abroad may
lead to major and disruptive foreign policy differences. The
much greater dependence of Japan and Continental Europe than the
U.S. on Middle East oil, -or the differential dependence on South
African resources could lead to serious conflicts of interest over
Middle East, or African, or Soviet policy.
Though the world is painfully conscious of the political
restrictions, oil-rich developing countries sometimes place on
resources, these countries are not the only ones to do so.
Canada and Australia have both restricted export of uranium
ore on nonproli feration grounds, and the UniLed States verely
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restricts export of enriched uranium on the basis of specific
political considerations. Moreover, the United States embargoed
soybean export for a short time in 1974 to stabilize domestic
prices, and has embargoed the sale of grain and high technology
to the Soviet Union in political protest to the Afghanistan
invasion. A cabinet member of the Reagan administration in his
first public statement spoke of using U.S food exports as a
foreign policy "weapon" (later changed to "tool") 8
These consequences of resource dependency and o'f unequal dis-
tribution are all political and economic in character. The issues
arising in the near future will be concerned with distribution
and availability, but .not with depletion. In the long-term, the
adequacy of resources will be determined by economic, not geolog-
ical, phenomena,9 and there is no reason to doubt that the
industrial system could cope with long-term changes in the
price and availability of materials and energy.
Short-term vulnerabilities must be met wi-th measures that
are largely outside the realm of science and technology directly:
stockpiling, political negotiations, pooling arrangements in
time of crisis, and so on. Conceivably, new R&D for resource
exploration, or exploitation of deep seabed minerals, could
change U.S. dependency on foreign resources, but this is unlikely
in a five-year time horizon.
In the longer term, science and technology have major
roles to play in the development of substitutes; in expanding
knowledge of resource exploration, recovery, processing, and use;
and more generally in contributing to innovation and productivity
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in the nation's industrial plant (both to'improve efficiency of
use of materials and fuels, and to generate the export earnings
necessary to pay for imports). The long lead times inherent in
reaching these objectives mandate early commitment of R&D to
these tasks.
The changing price and availability of materials and energy
may change critically the comparative advantage of some American
industries. The adjustments necessary to allow the orderly de-
cline of those industries will themselves set up serious political
and economic strains.
The need for R&D in the resource area is coupled with an
inadequate understanding, both in the United States and globally, 10
of certain areas: geological deposition of minerals; the explora--
tion process; and the impact of the changing industrial structure
in minerals on the flow of mineral supplies. 1 ^
These tasks will require reinvigoration of concerned govern-
ment agencies, especially the Bureau of Mines and Geological
Survey, and may also require a new institutional means to develop
an objective, credible data base (technical and economic) for
resource-related decisions. In addition, coordination of
policymaking must be improved to avoid conflicting policies
carried out by individual agencies which are not aware of the
activities of other agencies.
Environment and Global Commons
Closely related to resource and energy issues are those
involving trans.border environmental questions, and more general
global issues of the environment: atmosphere, oceans, and
outer space.
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Our national activities have effects beyond borders and,
in some cases, on a global scale. Transborder pollution has
already become an important issue in many areas of the world,
with some progress in the last decade, particularly in melding
environmental policies, in reaching international agreements, or
dealing with the traditional problem of the global commons. The
issues are likely to become more severe, however, and often will
take on the cast of zero-sum games.
The worldwide recession and the rise in energy prices
raise the indirect costs of coping with environmental degradation,
and make it more difficult politically to restrict activities
whose harmful effects fall across the border. The standard
problem of reflecting full costs in a production process is
exacerbated when the externalities are felt outside a national
economy. Issues associated with acid rain, water pollution,
forest degradation, and others will become more contentious
internationally in the next decade.
The depressed economic situation will also lead to greater
resistance to domestic environmental regulation if that is assumed
to affect adversely the international competitive position of a
nation's goods. As noted earlier, it is not always appropriate
to call for common environmental standards in all nations, and
even when it is, it is not clear they can be successfully nego-
tiated. Thus, the costs and bases for domestic environmental
regulations are likely to be difficult issues because of their
international implications.
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Some long-term issues may become clearer in the next
few years as research increases understanding of important global
systems. In particular, CO- buildup and NOX in the atmosphere
may be better understood along with their global economic
implications and potential ways of controlling them. Unprece-
dented disputes could arise over such issues, with important
changes in the status of individual nations, as some benefit--
say through improved agricultural conditions--and others are
hurt--for example, if the costs of environmental controls fall
more heavily on them. It is unlikely that these issues will
come to a head in a few years, but the debate could be far
advanced.
Exploitation of global commons, especially the oceans and
outer space, is likely to proceed during the coming decade. The
Law of the Seas negctiat ion, which proposed. a new international
institution responsible for overseeing the mining of the resources
of the seabed, appeared to be almost completed, though the posi-
tion of the United States is now in doubt. Many aspects of that
institution would be novel, in particular the assigning of some
of the benefits of mining to developing countries. The detailed
questions of implementation would be left to the interim arrange-
ments following the completion of the treaty and ultimately to
the new authority. Some serious disputes are inevitable, with
regard to the mining itself, the operation of the authority,
and the unprecedented provisions for transfer of technology in
the draft treaty.12 Certainly, if there is no treaty, a variety
of ocean issues--navigation, fishing, oil exploration, research,
as well as mining, may become the source of serious dispute.
In space applications controversy may arise over geosta--
tionary orbit allocations, but more likely will be controversy
over the international efforts to manage and control space tech-
nology systems such as Landsat. This earth resource surveillance
system has been until now an experimental American monopoly, but
as it moves to operational status, many questions will become more
pressing. Who owns the information in a world in which sovereignty
of resources has been zealously asserted? Should the output be
available to anyone who asks for it? What rights do nations
have for unilateral surveillance of another country's resources?
What are the security implications of the high resolution that
will now be built into the system? Who should manage the sys-
tem, and determine its technical characteristics? What are the
economic and political implications of greater knowledge of
resource endowments, of more accurate annual predictions of
agricultural production domestically and internationally?
Undoubtedly, these issues will soon become more prominent
on the international political agenda.
Interaction of National Technological Systems
Many national systems--aircraft, communications, weather
observation, finance, banking, postal--are basically information
systems which require interaction with counterparts in other
nations. The explosive development of information technologV
systems has begun to cause serious strains, and is likely to
be an even larger cause of strain in the coming years.
Traditional differences between fields break dowa V(or
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example, communications versus data flows, postal versus elec-
tronic mail, information versus banking) , and the economic
calculus of benefits and costs changes perceptibly. Controversies
arise over privacy of information, access to information within
nations, the role of central computer banks, the transnational
nature of economies of scale, and related issues. In the face of
U.S. dominance of technology, other Western countries are wary of
allowing unfettered development that undermines their competitive
position; the Soviet Union and its allies worry because control
of information is vital to its political system; the developing
countries worry that the loss of control over information will
threaten their independence.
The dynamic nature of the growth of this technology, and
its base in the private sector in the United States, makes this
a particularly difficult issue in which to anticipate implications,
much less develop clear international policies and conduct
negotiations. It is certain to appear significantly on the inter-
national agenda in the 1980s.
National Security
Science and technology have been central factors in the
evolution of weapons and military systems in this century. They
have altered drastically not only the nature and scale of hostil-
ities, but the very meaning of strategic war as an option to
achieve national objectives. The strength and productivity of
a nation's advanced technological community have become major
elements in any geopolitical calculation. Massive sup;ort for
security-related R&D hs, in turn, changed scienco, tcnclogy,
and the university.
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The application of science to national security shows no
sign of abatement. In fact, a new round of major commitments
to large-scale strategic systems is in the offing, turning the
ratchet one more notch in a search for security that seems
steadily receding into the future.
In the context of this paper, only a few general issues
in this area can be briefly touched upon; clearly it is an
enormous subject that in itself the subject of a large
literature. 13
One controversy concerns whether the constant search
for more technologically advanced weapons systems in fact
contributes to the nation's (or the world's) security.
Whatever the views of the causes of the arms race between
the Soviet Union and the United States, or the current stat,-
of relations between the super powers, new weapons systems
often make the arms balance more precarious, more vulnerable
to preemptive action rather than contributing to stability.
This may continue, and perhaps worsen, as capabilities are
pursued that threaten concealment of weapons systems, give
greater premium to surprise, and make it harder to know
whether missiles contain one or many independent warheads.
Developments in conventional weapons, moving rapidly, may
also change the nature of "local" war, leading to greater
instability among developing countries as one or another
believes it has the capability for rapid strike and victory.
No simple solutions exist. It is easy in rhetoric to
call, for example, for more attention to military and related
systems that. contribute to grcater stability and less uncertainty
.1.~ -
and threat: adequate conventional ground forces; improved
command, control, and communications in a hair-trigger weapons
environment; greater commitment to developing arms control
agreements, more attention to "hot-line" communication capa-
bility; less emphasis on strategic weapons that pose a first-
strike threat in favor of those with clear survivability; and
others. Each has its ambiguities, however, and there is no
agreement on what is required for security, or even for greater
stability.
The fact of the matter is that science and technology are
most likely to continue to alter military systems. The effects
of these changes cannot always be anticipated. One of the ob-
jectives of arms control is to bring the situation under greater
control; but even if one were optimistic about SALT II, agreements
of this sort deal only with existing or planned technology. They
do not deal with the possibility of new weapons systems or unan-
ticipated capabilities created by further research.
Our knowledge of "threat systems," the involvement of the
scientific and technological community in strategic debates, the
public perceptions of military and strategic affairs are all
inadequate. The once substantial public role of scientists
and engineers in strategic policy deliberations, for example,
has been greatly reduced, and the public inputs to arms control
and weapons debates have suffered. This is illustrated by the
spectacle of the stagnation of the SALT II agreement in the
U.S. Senate over essentially extraneous issues.
Some argue that the whole framework of the strategic de-
bate has been rendered inadequate. They call for emercence
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of a new paradigm, a new discipline of conflict studies, and
assign the scientific cornmunity special responsibility in
bringing this about. The argument of the inadequate framework
of debate is persuasive, although the path for achieving a
new paradigm is hard to discern in practical terms.
The scientific and engineering communities have special but
more traditional responsibilities within the existing framework
particularly because of the esoteric technical aspects of the
issues. The relative neglect of these responsibilities in recent
years must be reversed. New programs such as arms control fellow-
ships in the National Academy of Sciences and a concomitant program
of studies are to be applauded, and similar initiatives in other
scientific organizations are to be encouraged. In all these
efforts, however, it is important to recognize that the issues
themselves are never purely technical. Real participation in-
volves a commitment to master the political, economic, and related
aspects,,which will eventually determine the outcome.
The quality of debate needs to be improved in the public
sector as well as in the scientific communities. Better infor-
mation, and greater resources, public and private, committed to
the analytical area are badly needed. The momentum of a defense
budget close to $200 billion requires open debate of the ,purposes,
details, and implications of that budget. In turn, more funding
is required to produce information and analysis to make public
debate possible. The Congressional Commission to study the
establishment of a National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolu-
tion presumably has the same goal.15
One aspect of the role of science and technology in weapons
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development is peculiarly troubling. Much of the initial
development of ideas for new technology--ideas that may later
be revolutionary in military terms--occurs in the laboratory
at a very early stage, without military applications in mind,
and often without military funding. This dynamic of the re-
search process leads to instability, both in weapons development
and in the long-term viability of arms control agreements.
Little can be done about this now, although ultimately
ways of -bringing R&D within the scope of arms control agreements
must be considered. One aspect, somewhat farther along the R&D
chain, does deserve institutional attention, however.
Proposals for new weapons development are, in their early
stages, often made at low levels in the bureaucracy, with relatively
little R&D funding required. At these levels, choices tend to
be made on strictly technical grounds, with little consideration
of their ultimate effect on relevant arms control objectives.
The situation is repeated at higher levels as well, so that it is
not uncommon for the government to be faced with mature weapons
designs creating major new foreign policy problems that might
have been avoided or eased if some alternative technical options
had been chosen instead.
It is very difficult to deal with this issue in the bureau-
cracy, since the organization of government serves to create
bureaucracies with compartmentalized obj'ectives and few or negative
incentives to introduce considerations for which they are not
responsible. An attempt to introduce nonproliferation considera-
tions into planning for nuclear reactor R&D, through participation
of a State Department representative in the setting of objectives
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in the Department of Energy, has apparently had some limited
success, and deserves evaluation.
In its most general formulation, this task can be stated
as the need to include, in defense R&D planning and management,
the evaluation of broader effects of the intended results of
research. The objective is an important one and ought to be the
focus of further experimentation.
Other aspects of science, technology, and security are also
troubling; some because of the effects on nonmilitary areas.
The sharp increase in defense spending proposed by the adminis-
tration will have important effects on the civilian sector,
not only in the obvious impact on the budget. Engineers,
already in short supply, will be siphoned off in larger num-
bers to defense industry, exacerbating the shortage in consumer
goods industries, and likely worsening the nation's competitive
position. It will also tend to stimulate even more the momentum
of scientific and technological change applied to military hard-
ware, since the level of R&D, and the ideas for new applications,
will be fueled by the larger cadre of scientists and engineers.
The increase in defense spending may also affect the nation's
universities, as they become concerned about the almost direct
military application of basic research. Signs of that are
already evident in cryptological applications of theoretical
mathematics, which have led to a kind of voluntary censorship.16
Lastly, it must be noted that the Soviet Union has demon-
strated its competence to engage the United States in a high-
technology arms race. Its technology may not be as refined, but
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its greater commitment of resources to defense expenditures is
presumed by many to be likely to give the Soviets an edge of some
sort over the United States in the latter part of this decade.
Whether this prediction is accurate or not, its antici-
pation has already fueled a massive new U.S. defense increase.
One can only observe that a continued search for strategic
superiority over a determined opponent is the search for a
chimera that can only distract from the real quest for security.
East/West Transfer of Technology
Another issue which is likely to be of considerable moment
in the next five years is the concern over the transfer of tech-
nology to the Eastern bloc that could enhange the military capa-
bility of the Soviet Union and its allies.J
This is an issue with a history stemming from the advent
of the cold war, and with recent attention as a result of the
embargo on high technology imposed in response to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. It is bedeviled by controversy between
the United States and its NATO allies over the costs and benefits
of the policy, by uncertainty over the military relevance of some
"dual use" technologies, by sharp differences of view within the
American government, by differences of philosophy over the value
of denial in terms of its actual effects, and by differences with
industry over enforcement policy.
There is little question about the importance of embargoing
specific advanced military technology. Moving from technology
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with direct military applications, however, quickly leads to
gray areas, with uncertainty over military relevance, over
availability from uncontrolled sources, or even of whether
denial is in Western interests. Should the West, for example,
encourage the Soviet Union to improve its ability to explore
and recover its vast oil deposits?
Many more specifically technological questions arise, however:
How is technology actually transferred and adopted? What is the
real potential of diverting a piece of hardware from a peaceful
to a military application? And what actual difference would it
make? Is reverse engineering of a piece of equipment possible?
At what cost? On what time scale? How long will it take for a
particular technology to be developed?
All too often, the debate over technology export controls
is characterized not only by political naiveth, as though it is
simple to control the movement o5 technological information, but
also by lack of understanding of technological realities. The
importance of the issue, and its potential for damaging the West
politically and economically, will require effective integration
of the scientific and technological aspects in the policy debates.
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY PROCESS
Several themes run through the issue areas discussed above
that bear directly on institutional and process problems of the
United States in relation to the international consecuences and
use of science and technology. The most common theme is that the
international dimension of policy is inadequately reflcte d in
government policy making, and that the formal institutions of
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government militate against more effective recognition of
international issues. Though this observation may be valid for
many of the responsibilites of government, it is particularly,
and surprisingly, intensive in science and technology matters.
Other themes that emerge relate to the need for more effective
integration of scientific and technological aspects in many policy
areas, including more mechanisms for effective analysis and
anticipation of future imblications of science and technology;
and the need for new national and international institutions.
Some comments on each are in order.
International Dimension in Policy
The history, geography, and rich resources of the United
States all led naturally to a system dominated in institutional
form and political organization by domestic considerations.
Adaptation of the system to its new global role, and to its new
dependency on others, has been slow and halting, notwithstanding
the enormous sums of public money allocated fo'r this adaptation.
At the detailed level of decision making--budget decisions,
negotiations with the Congress or with the Office of Management
and Budget, setting technical objectives--the traditional pressures
dominate.
One of the most significant ways in which this situation
affects the involvement of science and technology with international
matters has to do with developing countries. The national re-
sources devoted to R&D on development problems is pitifully small,
yet the U.S. government lacks an effective instrument for cooper-
ating with that large number of increasinqly important dations
neither poor enough to be eligible for direct assistInce, nor
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sufficiently advanced scientifically to be competitive with
domescic research. A new institution--the Institute for Scin-
tific and Technological Cooperation--was proposed in 1978,
authorized in 1979, and ultimately left unfunded by the Congress.
Something to serve the same functions, whatever the form, is
required.
But the problem is not simply a new institution. The need is
to tap more effectively the scientific and technological resources
of the government housed in the functional departments and
agencies, and to enlist their R&D clients in the nation at large.
A single, new agency cannot accomplish that task alone, though
it might provide the leadership for much larger changes. Rather,
a means must be found for allowing departments and agencies to
allocate resources directly for cooperation with other nations
and to carry out R&D on problems that are not "American" problems,
when such activities are in the national interest. At present,
legal authorization or executive budget policy effectively pre-
vents such allocation except under difficult arrangements, some-
times sub-rosa, and almost always ad hoc.
The problem is not primarily legal, as Congress can change
the relevant laws, and has done so for some agencies. The problem
is largely one of efficient budgetary management. The Office
of Management and Budget argues, with considerable justification,
that it is difficult to maintain discipline in a budget if fuzzy
arguments of "foreign policy interest" have to be given weight
in ranking proposed programs, or if budgets to serve development
assistance objectives crop up in a score of federal agencies.
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Yet, the answer must surely be more creative than simply
to rule out such programs. One possibility, for example, would
be to create a development budget that crosses departmental lines
and forces a degree of budgetary discipline that cuts across
agencies and agency budgets.
Departments and agencies would be allowed, with congressional
concurrence, to budget some of their own funds for R&D, but those
projects would have to be compared not only with proposals within
the department, but also with proposals of other agencies. Similarly,
for those proposed programs that have mixed foreign policy (other
than development) and scientific objectives, a cross-agency evalu-
ation of foreign policy could exert the necessary budget discipline.
Although difficult to administer and subject to its own bureau-
cratic pitfalls (the temptation for playing budgetary games and
the difficulty of ranking according to foreign policy criteria)
this or something like it requires experimentation.
In another area, ways must be found domestically or inter-
nationally to deal with situations in which apparently domestic
regulations directly impinge on other countries or significantly
affect a country's international trade position. For some situa-
tions, the answer may have to be regulatory machinery within
existing or new international organizations. With regard to
trade regulation, more impetus will have to be given to the
move to analyze the broader economic effects of proposed
regulations before the regulations are approved.
International cooperation with advanced countries also
deserves more emphasis in the changing climate of cost and
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relative competence in science and tehcnology. But this change
in emphasis will not happen naturally in the American systi,
again because of the built-in focus on domestic problems ani
pressures. This problem of focus is exacerbated by the restrictions
imposed by the Office of Management and Budget on foreign travel,
and the suspicion in Congress that foreign travel by "domestic"
agency personnel simply implies junkets.
The blurring of domestic and international affairs
is real. Government at all levels must become aware of
and adapt to their ineradicable intertwining. It is not
a matter of simply creating an international office in
an agency. All have such offices, which more often than not
are weak and removed from the core of the agency's interests.
Rather, it is a matter of infusing the whole government
with policies, institutions, and rhetoric to make possible a
gradual change of attitude that conforms to today's and tomorrow's
reality. The Congress must also be no small part of that change,
and ought to be forcing the Executive Branch to recognize what
is needed.
Integration of Science and Technology in Policy
The problems of scientific and technological planning are
particularly severe, and pose major problems of governance in a
technological age. There are many aspects: how to represent
scientific and technological information and uncertainty adequately
in the policy process; how to plan for effects of science and
technology not only uncertain, but possibly seen too late to
alter once the effects are in evidence; how to estimate risks
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and benefits which fall unequally within a society or inter-
nationally, with interested people and nations often not repre-
sented in the policy process; how to deal with issues in which
the relevant information is under the monopoly of one segment
of society, or of one government; and a host of other issues.
No single solution is adequate. Like all problems of
governance, these problems are not solvable--all that is possible
is amelioration or improvement. However, these are difficulties
that directly involve understanding of science and technology,
and thus require not only greater participation of scientists
and engineers, but also more means for making credible analyses
available to the public, and ways of drawing the public into the
debates. Participation alone, of course, is not enough. Scien-
tists and engineers do not have, on the basis of their professional
training, superior credentials for making policy decisions. 'They
are no more free of bias than are other segments of society.
Participation by the scientific and technological communities
and technology and the broader aspects of policy, and a commitment
of time that makes such understanding possible. A technocratic
approach to the making of policy is not an improvement over the
present situation.
One of the effects of science and technology on both national
and international affairs is to make the future much more relevaIt
to the present than in earlier periods of human history. To an
unprecedented degree, today's policy must be made in the light
of future developments, particularly in science and technology
themselves, or in the side effects of increasingly technolo-ical
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societies. The importance of more efforts at credible, objective
anticipation of the future is obvious.
International Organizations and Structure
The need for new international instruments, or for modifying
existing ones was mentioned briefly in a few subjects--drug
regulation, ocean mining, space applications--but was not empha-
sized. The questions associated with international political
machinery, particularly machinery designed to deal with require-
ments growing out of science and technology, are many and complex.
The products of science and technology increasingly create
new issues and force traditional domestic issues into the inter-
national environment.~ Unfortunately, existing international
organizations charged with dealing with those issues are often
inadequate. Most global organizations are now politicized along
North/South lines, and more efficient regional or smaller alter-
natives do not represent all interested parties. As representation
in organizations broadens, technical efficiency tends to decrease.1 8
This situation is unlikely to reach crisis form'within
a few years, but in it are the seeds of major confrontation.
These seeds could mature quickly, if current budgetary reductions
drastically reduce U.S. presence in international organizazicns.
The adequacy of international political machinery is likely to
be a fundamental question of international security. So many of
the functions the world (and the United States) depends on--
communications, transport, nuclear materials control, resource
information, health, agriculture, ocean minerals, to say nothing
of international financingj and llnding--will fll icrea singly
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under the auspices of international organizations. Many of
the issues inolve developing: countries, but others involve
conflicts of interest among Western industrial countries, or
East/West controversies.
It is not a matter of indifference whether the organizations
exist or work. The functions they perform must be carried out
in some way by an organization, or by a limited number of countries,
or by a country acting on its own. The ultimate character of the
international system and the place of the United States in it
may in large measure be determined by whether these international
tasks are carred out through organizations with broad participa-
tion, but so designed as to allow reasonable efficiency, or by
default are managed by efficient but limited groups of wealthy
countries.
CONCLUSION 4
It may not be too far wrong to characterize this last
issue, and all that have been touched on it this paper, as funda-
mental choices in the international system between efficiency
and equity, and between hegemony and consensus. Those are
sufficient for any policy agenda.
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